Hezbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational Dimension (1/2)Amir Kulick - The Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), incorporates the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)-Tel Aviv University Readers Number : 30130/07/2007 This study, prepared by researcher Amir Kulick (Institute for National Security Studies -- Tel Aviv University), focuses on preparations and combat techniques used by both Hezbollah and the Israeli army during the July war of 2006. In the first part of this study (published by the Al-Akhbar daily in Beirut), the author concentrates on Hezbollah\'s methodology and the difference between it and the party\'s military approach in 1993 and 1996. The second part of the study (to be published Tuesday) will focus on Israeli military preparations.Hezbollah vs. the IDF: The Operational DimensionBy Amir Kulick\"The IDF\'s Combat Approach vs. HezbollahIf one were to generalize, one might say that since the War of Independence the IDF has been perceived by Arabs as a maneuvering army, that is, whose military operational doctrine centers on firepower and rapid maneuvers of large forces. And indeed, until the 1990s the major campaigns and operations waged by the IDF (except for the 1969-70 War of Attrition) were based on large scale maneuvers of ground forces. From the 1956 Sinai Campaign to the first Lebanon War in 1982, IDF infantry and armored forces operated deep in enemy territory at the early stages of fighting. The air campaign was perceived at first as mere assistance, and later as a parallel effort aimed at achieving air superiority, destroying enemy anti-aircraft installations and surface-to-surface missiles, and finally assisting ground forces. This perception has been evolving since the 1990s. The air campaign waged by the US in Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War and the campaign waged by NATO member states in Kosovo presented a different model of fighting, which centers on an air campaign. It seems that from this point, the weight the IDF assigned to air and artillery firepower began to shift. The low number of casualties in this brand of fighting, the hi-tech style of war, and the ability to rely on Israel\'s technological advantage all promoted this combat approach.This style of fighting, whose core is the \"fire-intense effort,\" was waged successfully against Hezbollah in 1993 during Operation Accountability. Hezbollah was highly surprised by this mode of warfare. The Shiite fighters had prepared for a ground campaign and for face to face fighting with the Zionist enemy. Instead, they encountered a very different campaign, one waged mostly in the space outside of their reach - from the air, from the border, and from within IDF strongholds in the security zone in Lebanon. From this campaign Hezbollah reached the requisite conclusions and came to the next confrontation much better prepared. Thus, during Operation Grapes of Wrath in April 1996, the organization relied primarily on Katyusha rockets that it launched towards northern settlements close to the border.Nonetheless, the IDF persisted in its line of thinking that centered on intense firepower, and thus most of the IDF fighting in the 1996 operation relied on the air force and artillery. Ground operations were few, limited mostly to Special Forces operations in launch site areas. These forces were sent into battle only after the IDF had essentially failed to reduce the volume of rocket fire into Israel\'s territory. In any event, as far as Hezbollah was concerned and regardless of the political outcome of the confrontation, the clashes of 1996 ended with relative success at the operational level. There were many lessons to be learned in the area of logistics (weapons shortages) and in aspects of command and control, but as a rule the organization was successful in launching Katyusha rockets into Israel up until the ceasefire.Hezbollah\'s Operational Preparation for Lebanon War IIFrom the end of the 1996 campaign and up to 2006, Hezbollah prepared for the next confrontation. Aided closely by Iran, it based its preparations on several assumptions derived from previous rounds of fighting, as well as from military and political developments of recent years. At the center was the organization\'s assumption that Israeli society is weak and cannot stomach a large number of casualties. In Hezbollah\'s eyes, this weakness induced the IDF withdrawal from the Lebanon security zone, and Hassan Nasrallah flaunted this ostensible frailty in his victory speech of May 26, 2000 in the border town of Bint Jbail, soon after the IDF\'s withdrawal from Lebanon, where he claimed that Israeli society is as weak as a spider web.On the operational level it seemed that Hezbollah decision-makers grasped that IDF fighting in the future would also be based on massive use of the air force and artillery. This realization was reinforced by minor intermediate rounds of the conflict in Lebanon as well as by IDF operations in the early years of the intifada, namely, the reluctance to deploy massive ground forces (at least until Operation Defensive Shield in April 2002) and reliance on the air force and limited use of special forces.Based on these assumptions (the weakness of Israeli society and the IDF\'s reliance on a firepower campaign), Hezbollah proceeded with its force buildup. The recent round of fighting demonstrated that the organization\'s primary operational objective was to wage a war of attrition against Israel\'s home front. Thus at the center of theorganization\'s combat approach was the need to strike within Israel\'s borders, as deeply as possible and throughout the fighting, even in the face of massive bombing or ground operations by special forces. On this basis, Hezbollah put in place three or four major fighting formations:* A short range artillery array relying primarily on Katyusha rockets. This array was to bear the burden of striking within Israel\'s borders.* A mid-range artillery formation, set up south of the Litani River. This formation launched most of the rockets that hit deep into Israel (the Haifa area and southward). It included 220 mm Syrian rockets and extended range Katyusha rockets.* Two additional long range rocket formations (up to 250 km) set up in the area between the Litani and Beirut (seen, for instance, when the air force attacked the Zelzal launcher in Beirut). These two formations were intended as strategic weapons of deterrence to allow Hezbollah to deal blows of varying intensity to Israel\'s soft underbelly - the area between Haifa and Tel Aviv. Alongside these three or four rocket formations was a ground array created south of the Litani based on underground tunnels and bunkers, explosives-ridden areas, and anti-tank units. This array was intended to confront ground forces to a limited extent, to stall ground incursions, and to inflict as many casualties as possible, which would wear out IDF forces, slow down their progress, and allow continued rocket fire into Israel. This operational infrastructure was apparently intended to form a basis for continued fighting by the organization, should the IDF reoccupy parts of southern Lebanon (the less likely but more dangerous scenario in Hezbollah\'s view).On the tactical level, in order to face the IDF\'s expected fighting mode, the organization chose three principal tactics:1. Saturating the area with (short range) rockets, and therefore over recent years Hezbollah stockpiled thousands of Katyusha launchers and rockets. The goal was to ensure a situation whereby Israel\'s destruction of multiple launchers, even dozens of them, would not inhibit Hezbollah\'s ability to sustain firepower. Thus, the launchers were spread out both in villages and in open areas, and indeed, the organization managed to maintain this formation and continue generating massive fire into Israel (an average of over 100 Katyusha rockets every day) throughout the war. Mobility. Based on different reports, it seems that most of the mid-range rockets fired into the Haifa, Afula, and Beit Shean areas were fired from mobile launchers (launchers installed on vehicles). Apparently these launchers were intended to allow Hezbollah fighters to launch the rockets and hide before air or artillery fire was directed at the launch site. To a large degree, this method failed. According to Israeli air force reports, almost any mid-range launcher that fired into Israel was destroyed.2. Advance preparation of a ground and logistics infrastructure for waging a prolonged campaign. This infrastructure included many weapons repositories south of the Litani River as well as an extensive ground infrastructure of bunkers and shelters. These were intended to help fighters survive in the face of aerial and artillery attacks and allow them to maintain operations for extended periods.The organization has created a hybrid command and control model. The cornerstone of its operational layout is a strict hierarchical organizational structure, with Nasrallah and the Jihad council (Hezbollah\'s \"general staff\") at the top of the pyramid. Below them are well formed units and formations. This structure enabled the organization to control - throughout the fighting - the amount of fire (\"the height of the flames\"), the firing units, and the strike range inside Israel. The organization chose to activate its mid-range fire array (south of the Litani) only after several days of fighting, while the long range rocket formation was not activated at all. Similarly, Hezbollah was able to hold its fire during the 48-hour truceduring the fighting and renew the rocket attacks shortly afterwards. In the same vein, once the ceasefire came into effect, this command structure ensured that the fighting halted in all areas.It is likely that with a looser organizational model, Hezbollah would not have succeeded in controlling the massive fire formations it created. Moreover, the organization\'s investment in a modern command and control infrastructure (such as the advanced control rooms discovered during IDF action in Bint Jbail) is evidence of its ambition to conduct the fighting in an orderly, well-timed manner. At the same time, alongside the hierarchical structure it seems that the ground fighting forces were given considerable free reign. There are two main reasons for that: one reason is the secondary role assigned to this formation - slowing down the ground campaign and inflicting casualties. The second reason is the estimation of the Hezbollah leadership, namely, that during an IDF large scale ground operation Hezbollah would not be able to control a large number of tactical events (whose importance for the overall campaign is in any case insignificant).The IDF withdrawal from Lebanon facilitated Hezbollah\'s military buildup. The low operational activity along the Israel-Lebanon border over the years allowed Hezbollah to allocate most of its operational resources to preparing its units for the next campaign with no interference. Without the IDF present south of the Litani, Hezbollah was able, unhindered, to build a wide-ranging infrastructure a short distance from the international border. Moreover, its presence on the border line likely enabled it to gather high-quality target intelligence regarding targets deep inside Israeli populated areas using advanced observation devices such as those discovered by the IDF in different villages in southern Lebanon. In addition, Hezbollah also operated agents within Israel, such as the two brothers from the village of Rajar who were arrested in late 2003 for collaborating with Hezbollah. Other examples are Ahmed al-Heib, arrested in November 2004, and Lt. Col. Omar al-Heib, arrested in February 2002, both suspected of providing information to Hezbollah.In addition, the short range rocket array deployed on the international border enabled the organization to extend the range of Katyusha rockets to many urban areas in Israel that were out of Hezbollah\'s reach before the IDF withdrawal, for example, Safed and Tiberias and even Haifa, which was targeted by mid-range Syrian rockets of 220 and 302 mm caliber, as well as by Katyusha rockets whose new range extended to 27-35 kilometers.\" congress, hizballah, hizbollah, idea, israel, lebanon, muslim, nasrallah, party, peace, resistence, school, uk, usa, victory, war, young